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The authors introduce a comprehensive revision of the Divisia monetary aggregates for the
United States published by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, referred to as the Monetary
Services Indexes (MSI). These revised MSI are available at five levels of aggregation, including a
new broad level of aggregation that includes all of the assets currently reported on the Federal
Reserve’s H.6 statistical release. Several aspects of the new MSI differ from those previously pub-
lished. One such change is that the checkable and savings deposit components of the MSI are now
adjusted for the effects of retail sweep programs, beginning in 1994. Another change is that alter-
native MSI are provided using two alternative benchmark rates. In addition, the authors have sim-
plified the procedure used to construct the own rate of return for small-denomination time deposits
and have discontinued the previous practice of applying an implicit return to some or all demand
deposits. The revised indexes begin in 1967 rather than 1960 because of data limitations. 
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financial assets selected by consumers and firms
may be separated into two groups. Some assets,
including currency and checkable bank deposits,
are innately medium of exchange—that is, usable
in the purchase and sale of goods and services—
while others cannot be used until converted to
medium of exchange.1 Generally, monetary assets
that differ in terms of their potential usefulness
as medium of exchange also differ in their own
rates of return. Barnett (1980) developed the
concept and theory of monetary index numbers,
Money is necessary to the carrying on of trade.
For where money fails, men cannot buy, and
trade stops.
—John Locke, Further Considerations
Concerning Raising the Value of Money
(1696, p. 319; quoted by Vickers, 1959)
M
oney plays a crucial role in the econ-
omy because the purchase and sale of
goods and services is settled in what
economists refer to as “medium of exchange.”
Forward-looking consumers and firms determine
their desired quantities of medium of exchange
at approximately the same time as they (i) form
expectations of future income and expenditure
and (ii) make decisions regarding desired quan-
tities of financial and nonfinancial assets. The
1 There are exceptions, of course. Bank checks, for example, are not
accepted by all merchants. Even for currency, there are exceptions
(see Twain, 1996). More seriously, currency issued by a sovereign
country often is not accepted in other countries; for a discussion
of monetary index numbers defined across currencies, see Barnett
(2007).
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gates.” Divisia aggregates measure, in a method
consistent with intertemporal microeconomic
theory, the aggregate flow of monetary services
derived by consumers and firms from a collec-
tion of monetary assets with different character-
istics and different rates of return. Underlying
Divisia monetary aggregates is the concept of the
user cost of a monetary asset, which is a func-
tion of the interest forgone by holding a specific
asset rather than an alternative asset that does
not provide any monetary services and earns a
higher rate of return (referred to as the “bench-
mark rate”). The close connection in microeco-
nomic theory between monetary index numbers
and agents’ anticipated income and expenditure
suggests that monetary index numbers should
be more closely related to economic activity than
conventional simple sum monetary aggregates
(see, for example, Hancock, 2005; Barnett and
Chauvet, 2011; Barnett, forthcoming).
THE MACROECONOMICS OF
MONETARY AGGREGATION
This article discusses how to construct mon-
etary index numbers (Divisia monetary aggregates)
for the United States.2 For the most part, we do
not address when or why such measurement and
aggregation might be desirable, which is contro-
versial to some extent among macroeconomists.
The extant principal body of current macroeco-
nomic analysis widely uses the concept of an
aggregate measure of money and distinctly sepa-
rates “money” from other assets, financial and
nonfinancial.3 Typically, macroeconomists define
“money” as financial assets that either are medium
of exchange or convertible to medium of exchange
at de minimus cost. Demand for such assets is
motivated in a macroeconomic model by either
cash-in-advance or shopping-time constraints or
a money-in-the-utility (or production) function
specification.4 Models differ, however, regarding
whether a household or firm might replenish a
depleted stock of money during the current period
by selling (or using as collateral) its nonmonetary
assets. If such a mechanism is permitted, the cor-
rect definition of a monetary aggregate for macro-
economic analysis depends on assumptions
regarding the liquidity of those assets that are not
medium of exchange.
A complementary, but alternative, line of
thought argues that (i) the concept of a monetary
aggregate in macroeconomics is unnecessary and
misleading and (ii) models should focus on the
functions of financial assets, including as a
medium of exchange and an intertemporal store
of value. Monetary aggregates, for example, have
no role in the class of recent search-based macro-
economic models that Stephen Williamson and
Randall Wright have labeled “New Monetarist
economics.”5 Although the exchange of goods
and services is fundamental in such models, the
role of an asset as a medium of exchange is unim-
portant because the models (implicitly or explic-
itly) assume a transformation technology such
that (almost) any asset can fulfill the functional
role of medium of exchange—that is, all assets
are liquid. For example, Williamson and Wright
(2010, p. 294) write:
Note as well that theory provides no particular
rationale for adding up certain public and pri-
vate liabilities (in this case currency and bank
deposits), calling the sum money, and attach-
ing some special significance to it. Indeed,
there are equilibria in the model where cur-
rency and bank deposits are both used in some
of the same transactions, both bear the same
rate of return, and the stocks of both turn over
once each period. Thus, Friedman, if he were
alive, might think he had good reason to call
the sum of currency and bank deposits money
and proceed from there. But what the model
tells us is that public and private liquidity play
Anderson and Jones
326 SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2011 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW
2 Throughout this analysis, the term “monetary assets” refers to those
financial assets that can provide “monetary services” during the
period—that is, they can serve as a medium of exchange. Some
assets (currency, checkable deposits) are immediately medium 
of exchange. Other assets have the standby capability to act as
medium of exchange if there exist markets that allow the assets to
be exchanged for medium of exchange when need be, either by
means of a sale or use as collateral.
3 Walsh (2010) is a comprehensive recent textbook treatment.
4 A classic analysis is King and Plosser (1984).
5 Williamson and Wright (2010, 2011).quite different roles. In reality, many assets are
used in transactions, broadly defined, includ-
ing Treasury bills, mortgage-backed securities,
and mutual fund shares. We see no real pur-
pose in drawing some boundary between one
set of assets and another, and calling members
of one set money.
New Monetarist-style models seek to illustrate
how a demand for monetary services arises as a
result of optimizing behavior by households and
firms. To do so, generally speaking, the models
assert that a shortage of medium of exchange is
costly in the sense that trades do not occur that
otherwise would be Pareto welfare-improving.
In such models, most financial assets are treated
as near-perfect substitutes; the role of the trans-
action costs entailed in exchanging an asset that
does not furnish medium of exchange services
for one that does is secondary, such that even
mortgage-backed securities furnish medium of
exchange (that is, monetary) services.
In a related recent analysis that addresses
neither the wisdom nor the necessity of monetary
aggregation, Holmström and Tirole (2011) ask if
transaction costs and “sudden stops” in financial
markets explain why households and firms choose
to hold larger quantities of highly liquid assets
than is suggested by models with de minimus
asset-market transaction costs. They note: “While
some forms of equity, such as private equity, may
not be readily sold at a ‘fair price,’ many long-
term securities are traded on active organized
exchanges…liquidating one’s position…can be
performed quickly and at low transaction costs”
(p. 1). Their analysis implies that not all financial
assets are perfect substitutes due to the risks that
(i) market trading might suddenly halt, (ii) differ-
ential user costs can arise in the solution to the
optimization problem facing households and
firms, and (iii) such differential user costs reflect
the differing amounts of monetary services fur-
nished by the assets.
THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL
RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS
The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis has
published monetary index numbers (initially
referred to as Divisia monetary aggregates and,
later, as Monetary Services Indexes [MSI]) for
two decades, beginning with Thornton and Yue
(1992) and continuing with Anderson, Jones,
and Nesmith (1997a,b,c) and Anderson and Buol
(2005). Publication of the most recent series was
suspended in March 2006 when certain necessary
data became unavailable. 
In this paper, we introduce a comprehensive
revision of the MSI constructed at five levels of
aggregation: MSI-M1, MSI-M2, MSI-M2M, MSI-
MZM, and MSI-ALL. MSI-M1 and MSI-M2 are
constructed, respectively, over the same compo-
nents included in the Federal Reserve Board’s
M1 and M2 monetary aggregates. MSI-ALL is con-
structed over all assets currently reported on the
Federal Reserve Board’s H.6 statistical release
(the components of M2 plus institutional money
market mutual funds [MMMFs]) and is the broad-
est level of aggregation that currently can be con-
structed from available data. Finally, MSI-M2M
and MSI-MZM are zero-maturity indexes (i.e.,
they exclude small-denomination time deposits).
One change to the indexes is the adjustment of
checkable and savings deposit components of
the MSI for the effects of retail sweep programs,
beginning in 1994. 
Several changes have been made to the user
costs of the components. Among these, we dis-
continued the previous practice of assigning an
implicit return to some or all demand deposits
and simplified the procedure used to construct
the own rate for small-denomination time deposits.
We also improved measures of savings and small
time deposit rates in the Regulation Q era; as a
consequence, the start date of the MSI has been
changed from 1960 to 1967. Finally, the MSI are
now constructed using two different benchmark
rates. Our preferred benchmark rate is the maxi-
mum taken over the own rates of the components
of MSI-ALL and a set of short-term money market
rates (referred to in the literature as the “upper
envelope”) plus a small liquidity premium. The
alternative benchmark rate is the larger of our
preferred benchmark rate and the Baa bond yield.
Previous practice had been to simply include the
Baa bond yield in the upper envelope.
The remainder of the paper is organized as
follows. The next section provides a brief over  -
Anderson and Jones
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describe the MSI and their changes relative to
Anderson, Jones, and Nesmith (1997c). Next, we
examine the empirical properties of the MSI,
emphasizing the time-series behavior of the
indexes. The final section offers some conclusions. 
MONETARY AGGREGATION AND
INDEX NUMBER THEORY
This section briefly reviews the economic
theory of monetary aggregation. Readers interested
primarily in the data may skip this section with-
out loss of continuity; readers seeking a more
comprehensive survey might consult Anderson,
Jones, and Nesmith (1997b).
The user cost of a monetary asset, defined as
the interest income forgone by holding a specific
financial asset rather than a higher-yielding asset
that does not provide monetary services, plays
an essential role in monetary aggregation theory.
Divisia monetary aggregates are chain-weighted
superlative indexes constructed over the quanti-
ties and user costs of selected sets of monetary
assets. The earliest Divisia aggregates for the
United States were constructed at the Federal
Reserve Board through the mid-1980s by Barnett,
Offenbacher, and Spindt (1981) and, later, by Farr
and Johnson (1985), who introduced the descrip-
tive label “Monetary Services Indexes.”6
Background
Barnett (1978, 1980) developed Divisia mone-
tary aggregates from aggregation and index num-
ber theory; see Barnett and Serletis (2000) for a
comprehensive overview. The basic ideas can be
illustrated with a simple money-in-the-utility
function model. In each period t, a representative
consumer is assumed to maximize lifetime utility:
where cs denotes a vector of quantities of a set of
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a vector of real stocks of a set of monetary assets.
The budget constraints are given by
for all s ≥ t, where bs denotes the real stock of a
benchmark asset that does not enter into the util-
ity function, Ys represents nominal income not
due to asset holdings, p* s is a price index used to
convert nominal stocks to real terms, ps is the
price vector for the nonmonetary goods and serv-
ices, Rs is the nominal rate of return on the bench-
mark asset, and rn,s is the nominal own rate of
return (possibly zero) for the nth monetary asset. 
The user cost of each monetary asset is
derived from the above maximization. Barnett
(1978) derived the formula for the user cost of a
monetary asset by combining individual-period
budget constraints into a single lifetime budget
constraint. When optimizing in period t, current-
period real money balances, mn,t, are multiplied
in the lifetime budget constraint by ˀn,t = p* t un,t,
where
Consequently, ˀn,t is the user cost for mn,t.7
Usually, ˀn,t is referred to as the “nominal user
cost” and un,t as the corresponding “real user cost”
(Barnett, 1987, p. 118). In an alternative derivation,
Donovan (1978, pp. 682-86) obtained the same
expression by applying the user cost formula 
for a durable good to interest-bearing monetary
assets.8 Diewert (1974, p. 510) did the same for
non-interest-bearing assets.
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6 Divisia money measures for the United Kingdom have been main-
tained by the Bank of England since the early 1990s (see Fisher,
Hudson, and Pradhan, 1993, and Hancock, 2005).
7 More generally, when optimizing in period t, the (discounted)
user cost for mn,s￿s ≥ t+1￿ is given by 
See Barnett (1978) for further discussion. Diewert (1974) provides
analogous expressions for durable goods.
8 The user cost of a durable good is the difference between the pur-
chase price of a unit of the good and the present value of the sale
price one period later (adjusted for depreciation). Donovan’s argu-
ment is as follows: Holding p* t dollars of a monetary asset in period
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1 1 1 1 A key property in aggregation and index
number theory is weak separability. In the present
context, monetary assets are weakly separable
from the other goods and services included in
the utility function if 
where U is strictly increasing in V (see Varian,
1983, p. 104). Under weak separability, utility
maximization in period t implies that the vector
of real money balances, mt, chosen in that period
maximizes the sub-utility function, V￿m￿, subject
to the budget constraint, ˀt . m = ˀt . mt, where ˀt
is a vector of nominal user costs.9
Chain-weighted superlative indexes con-
structed from data on the quantities of monetary
assets and their user costs can be used to measure
how V￿mt￿ evolves over time; here, we provide
an overview (see the appendix for details). Specifi  -
cally, the MSI are based on the superlative
Törnqvist-Theil formula. The chain-weighted
Törnqvist-Theil monetary quantity index is
where 
is the expenditure share for the nth monetary
asset for period t. The index has the attractive
property that its log difference is a weighted aver-
age of the log differences of its components:
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Barnett (1980) interpreted the Törnqvist-Theil
index as a discrete-time approximation of the
continuous-time Divisia index, which is the origin
of the term Divisia monetary aggregate. As he
emphasized, in continuous time the Divisia index
is exact for any linearly homogeneous utility
function.10
The MSI and Their Dual User Cost
Indexes
The published St. Louis MSI are constructed
from nominal rather than real monetary asset
quantities and, in that sense, are nominal mone-
tary index numbers; corresponding real MSI can
be obtained by dividing the nominal MSI by a
price index. We also publish real user cost indexes
for the various MSI that are suitable for use in
empirical work as the opportunity costs of those
MSI. The real user cost indexes can be multiplied
by a price index to obtain corresponding nominal
user cost indexes. This is analogous to the rela-
tionship between real and nominal user costs of
individual monetary assets as discussed above.
Specifically, let pt * denote a price index, and
let Mn,t and mn,t denote the nominal and real
quantities, respectively, of the nth monetary
asset—that is, mn,t = Mn,t/pt *. Let un,t be the corre-
sponding real user cost, which does not depend
on the price index. The corresponding nominal
user cost is ˀn,t =pt *un,t. The published nominal
MSI are constructed using nominal monetary
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Thus, the purchase price of a real dollar of the monetary asset is
p* t and the sale price of a real dollar of the asset one period later is
p* t+1. If the asset earns interest, holding p* t dollars of the asset for
one period results in p* t ￿1 + rn,t￿/p* t+1 real dollars of the asset one
period later. Consequently, the user cost of the monetary asset is
9 Barnett (1982) emphasizes weak separability in choosing the
components of a monetary aggregate. Varian (1982, 1983) derived
necessary and sufficient conditions for a dataset to be consistent
with utility maximization and weak separability. A number of
studies have applied tests of these conditions to determine if spe-
cific groupings of monetary assets are weakly separable. For recent
examples, see Jones, Dutkowsky and Elger (2005), Drake and
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10 If mt maximizes V￿m￿ subject to the budget constraint ˀt . m = 
ˀt . mt for all t and V￿m￿ is linearly homogeneous, then in the 
continuous-time case 
which corresponds to the continuous-time Divisia quantity index
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1The expenditure shares can be computed from
nominal monetary asset quantities and real user
costs, since 
Real MSI are obtained by dividing the nominal
MSI by the price index pt *. This is equivalent to
constructing the MSI using real quantities of
individual assets when the real quantities are
defined using the same price index—that is, for
all n, mn,t = Mn,t/pt *, since
Let ʠt and Ut denote, respectively, the nominal
and real user cost indexes for a specific MSI. The
user cost index, Ut, is computed via factor reversal
with its corresponding nominal MSI:
The nominal user cost index for the same MSI is
ʠt = pt *Ut. Because nominal MSI can be converted
to real MSI via division by a price index, it follows
that nominal user cost indexes satisfy factor rever-
sal with the corresponding real MSI:
CONSTRUCTING THE NEW
MONETARY SERVICES INDEXES
This section describes the specification and
construction of selected components of the
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not exclusively, on aspects of the MSI that differ
substantively from our earlier work (Anderson,
Jones, and Nesmith, 1997c). We caution readers
that this section is necessarily detail oriented,
but understanding the details, though sometimes
tedious, is essential if the MSI are to be used
intelligently in economic research and policy-
making.
Aggregation Levels, Components, and
Segments 
The revised St. Louis MSI introduced in this
article are monthly data beginning in January
1967; when this paper was written, the most
recent available data were for May 2011.12 The
indexes are published at five levels of aggregation:
MSI-M1, MSI-M2, MSI-M2M, MSI-MZM, and
MSI-ALL. MSI-M1 and MSI-M2 are defined
over the financial assets included in the Federal
Reserve Board’s M1 and M2 monetary aggregates.
MSI-ALL is defined over the broadest set of finan-
cial asset data currently available (to us), includ-
ing the components of MSI-M2 plus institutional
MMMFs. MSI-M2M and MSI-MZM are defined
over zero-maturity assets—that is, financial assets
immediately available for spending. More specifi-
cally, MSI-M2M is defined over the components
of MSI-M2 except small-denomination time
deposits, and MSI-MZM is defined over the com-
ponents of MSI-M2M plus institutional MMMFs
(equivalently, it includes all components of MSI-
ALL except small-denomination time deposits).
Table 1 summarizes the components of the
MSI. Readers should note that the number of
components included in the MSI varies from
month to month due to data availability. Exam  -
ples of newly available data that increased the
number of components include retail MMMFs
(February 1973), institutional MMMFs (January
1974), other checkable deposits (OCDs) at com-
Anderson and Jones
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11 This follows from the fact that the expenditure shares add up to 1.
12 A qualification: Publication by the Board of Governors of figures
regarding the deposit amounts involved in retail sweep programs
lags by one month the publication of monetary data on the Board’s
H.6 statistical release. In constructing the MSI each month using
the H.6 data, we carry forward the previous month’s sweep pro-
gram figures. These figures subsequently are replaced with pub-
lished data as they become available.mercial banks (January 1974), money market
deposit accounts (MMDAs) (December 1982),
and Super negotiable order of withdrawal (Super
NOW) accounts (January 1983).13 The introduc-
tion of new assets is handled using a procedure
suggested by Diewert (1980) (see Anderson, Jones,
and Nesmith, 1997c, pp. 77-78, for details). 
Because of data availability, each of the MSI
is constructed in four segments: January 1967–
December 1985, December 1985–January 1987,
January 1987–August 1991, and August 1991
onward. The published MSI are created by splic-
ing these segments at their boundaries via rescal-
ing. Because the MSI and their segments are
Anderson and Jones
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index numbers, the information content of the
MSI is unaffected by rescaling.
The first segment and the December 1985
splice are due to the fact that we have sufficient
data to treat Super NOW accounts and other OCDs
as separate components from the date they enter
the MSI (January 1983) through December 1985;
thereafter, the MSI include the totals of Super
NOW accounts and other OCDs (at both commer-
cial banks and thrift institutions) as single com-
ponents. The second segment and the January
1987 splice are due to a change in the availability
of interest rate data for MMMFs as discussed
below. The third segment and the August 1991
splice are due to the fact that we have sufficient
data to treat MMDAs and savings deposits as
separate components from the time they enter
the MSI (December 1982) through August 1991;
thereafter, the MSI include the total of MMDAs
and savings deposits (at both commercial banks
and thrift institutions) as a single component. As
Table 1
Components of the Monetary Services Indexes
Monetary asset Sample period M1 M2M MZM M2 ALL
Currency Jan. 1967–present ￿￿￿￿￿
Travelers checks Jan. 1967–present ￿￿￿￿￿
Demand deposits Jan. 1967–present ￿￿￿￿￿
OCDs at commercial banks Jan. 1986–present ￿￿￿￿￿
OCDs at thrift institutions Jan. 1986–present ￿￿￿￿￿
Super NOW accounts at commercial banks Jan. 1983–Dec. 1985 ￿￿￿￿￿
Super NOW accounts at thrift institutions Jan. 1983–Dec. 1985 ￿￿￿￿￿
OCDs at commercial banks excluding Super NOW accounts  Jan. 1974–Dec. 1985 ￿￿￿￿￿
OCDs at thrift institutions excluding Super NOW accounts  Jan. 1967–Dec. 1985 ￿￿￿￿￿
Savings deposits at commercial banks Sep. 1991–present ￿￿￿￿
Savings deposits at thrift institutions Sep. 1991–present ￿￿￿￿
MMDAs at commercial banks Dec. 1982–Aug. 1991 ￿￿￿￿
MMDAs at thrift institutions Dec. 1982–Aug. 1991 ￿￿￿￿
Savings deposits at commercial banks excluding MMDAs Jan. 1967–Aug. 1991 ￿￿￿￿
Savings deposits at thrift institutions excluding MMDAs Jan. 1967–Aug. 1991 ￿￿￿￿
Retail money funds Feb. 1973–present ￿￿￿￿
Institutional money funds Jan. 1974–present ￿￿
Small-denomination time deposits at commercial banks  Jan. 1967–present ￿￿
Small-denomination time deposits at thrift institutions Jan. 1967–present ￿￿
13 Throughout this article, OCDs consists of NOW and automatic
transfer service accounts at depository institutions, credit union
share draft accounts, and demand deposits at thrift institutions.
Demand deposits are deposits at commercial banks that are legally
demandable from the bank without prior notice. MMDA deposits
have limited third-party transfer features as specified by the Garn-
St. Germain Act of 1982 and the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010.discussed below, the source of the data used to
construct own rates for the deposit components
of the MSI also differs before and after August
1991.
Retail Sweep Adjustment 
Retail sweep programs at depository institu-
tions began in January 1994. The Federal Reserve’s
Board of Governors described the purpose and
effects of these programs in its annual report for
1999 (p. 59):
Deposits in M1 declined further in 1998,
reflecting the continued introduction of retail
‘‘sweep’’ programs. Growth of M1 deposits
has been depressed for a number of years by
these programs, which shift—or ‘‘sweep’’—
balances from household transactions accounts,
which are subject to reserve requirements, into
savings accounts, which are not. Because the
funds are shifted back to transactions accounts
when needed, depositors’ access to their funds
is not affected by these programs. However,
banks benefit from the reduction in holdings
of required reserves, which do not pay interest.
In the Board’s H.6 statistical release, funds that
have been swept from transaction deposits to
savings deposits (specifically, to MMDAs) are
included in published savings deposit figures
rather than in transaction deposit figures. Hence,
published figures for demand deposits and OCDs
are too small relative to the deposit amounts that
consumers and firms perceive themselves as
holding at depository financial institutions, and
published figures for savings deposits are too
high. (Note that the published sum of transaction
deposits plus savings deposits, and hence the
Federal Reserve’s M2 monetary aggregate, is
unaffected by retail deposit sweep activity.) Pre  -
cise data on the amount of deposits affected by
retail deposit sweeping are not available because
banks are not required to report to the Federal
Reserve the amounts of deposits affected by retail
sweep programs. Nevertheless, Federal Reserve
Board staff estimate the amounts each month,
and their estimates are available publicly on the
St. Louis Fed’s website.14 Figure 1 plots demand
deposits, OCDs, and their sum since 1994 both
Anderson and Jones
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as reported on the H.6 statistical release and after
adjustment for sweep effects. According to these
estimates, since 2001 no less than 41 percent of
total transaction deposits has been swept into
savings deposits under retail sweep programs;
between early 2005 and late 2008, more than 50
percent of such deposits was swept. If the esti-
mated amounts of funds swept since 2001 were
added to the Federal Reserve’s M1 monetary aggre-
gate, its level would increase by 27 percent to 36
percent. (Note: Figure 1 incorporates an estimated
separation of swept amounts between demand
deposits and OCDs; this allocation is based on
unpublished data that are not publicly available.)
Due to insufficient data, Anderson, Jones, and
Nesmith (1997c) did not consider the effects of
retail sweeping on the MSI. In this revision, the
MSI are constructed from data adjusted for the
effects of retail sweeping (see Jones, Dutkowsky,
and Elger, 2005).15 Specifically, estimated swept
amounts are added to demand deposits and OCDs
and subtracted from savings deposits. The adjust-
ment significantly affects MSI-M1 because savings
deposits are not included in that index, while the
effect is much smaller on the broader indexes.16
Figure 2 plots MSI-M1 against a comparable index
constructed over components not adjusted for
retail sweeping; failing to adjust for the effects of
retail sweeps causes significant understatement
of MSI-M1.17
14 See http://research.stlouisfed.org/aggreg/swdata.html. These figures
are produced by the staff of the Federal Reserve Board. The precise
method of estimation is not made public. For further discussion
of retail sweeping, see Anderson (1995), Anderson and Rasche
(2001), Dutkowsky and Cynamon (2003), Duca and VanHoose
(2004), Jones, Dutkowsky, and Elger (2005), Dutkowsky, Cynamon,
and Jones (2006), Elger, Jones, and Nilsson (2006), and Jones et al.
(2008).
15 Jones, Dutkowsky, and Elger (2005) adjust the MSI components
for the effects of both retail and commercial sweeps. We do not
consider the effects of commercial sweeping in this paper. Elger,
Jones, and Nilsson (2006) analyze a Divisia M1 series constructed
with data adjusted for the effects of retail sweeping. 
16 This, of course, also is true for summation aggregates such as those
published on the Federal Reserve Board’s H.6 statistical release.
The Federal Reserve’s M2 aggregate is unaffected by retail sweep-
ing, while the level of the M1 aggregate is significantly reduced.
17 The indexes plotted in the figure are constructed using our pre-
ferred benchmark rate. Measurement of the benchmark rate is
addressed in the next section.Benchmark Rates
The theory of monetary aggregation assumes
that there exists a benchmark asset that furnishes
no monetary services—that is, an asset that is used
only to transfer wealth from period to period. It
is assumed that the benchmark asset provides no
“standby” or precautionary liquidity because it
is not convertible into medium of exchange during
the planning period at less than a confiscatory
transaction cost. While the conceptual definition
of the benchmark asset is straightforward, meas-
uring that concept is not at all so. As noted by
Fisher, Hudson, and Pradhan (1993, p. 243) and
Barnett (2003, p. 50), the benchmark asset cannot
be an asset that is easily traded on a secondary
market. Today, however, almost all financial assets
may be used as collateral in repurchase transac-
Anderson and Jones
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Figure 1
Retail Sweeping of Transaction Deposits (1994-2011)tions, thereby allowing conversion of the asset
into medium of exchange without its sale. How,
then, is the benchmark rate to be measured? 
Fisher, Hudson, and Pradhan (1993) devel-
oped U.K. Divisia money measures for the Bank
of England. As described by Hancock (2005, 
pp. 40-41), before a set of recent changes to those
measures the benchmark rate was the 3-month
rate on local government bills plus a premium
of 200 basis points. Without the added premium,
the benchmark rate would sometimes be below
the own rates of some components.18 Following
Fisher, Hudson, and Pradhan (1993), Jones et al.
(2008) constructed user costs for the components
of MSI-M2 using the 6-month Treasury bill rate
plus 200 basis points as the benchmark rate for
the period from 1987 to 2004.19
Following Barnett and Spindt (1982), the
Divisia monetary aggregates produced by the
Board of Governors and subsequently by the 
St. Louis Fed have all taken the benchmark rate
to be the maximum of the Baa corporate bond
yield and the set of interest rates used to construct
the component user costs. However, this approach
clearly is subject to mismeasurement. In any sto-
chastic model with forward-looking agents, the
anticipated flows of income and consumption
relative to expected holding-period yields (includ-
ing transaction costs) determine, at least in part,
agents’ portfolio choices (including the quantities
of monetary assets) and hence the purchased quan-
tities of monetary services. Stracca (2004, p. 313)
emphasizes the econometrician’s inability to
measure these expected holding period yields
for long-maturity assets:
Theoretically, the benchmark asset should be
capital-certain…and at the same time provide
18 From a measurement error perspective, if the measure of the
benchmark rate generates negative user costs, then the measure-
ment error in that measure is relatively high. 
19 Hancock (2005, p. 42) notes that a Treasury bill rate could be used
as a proxy for the rate on local government bills. Bissoondeeal et
al. (2010) construct a U.K. index following this suggestion. 
Anderson and Jones
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Unadjusted for Retail Sweep Effects
Figure 2
Effect of Retail Sweep Adjustments on MSI-M1 (1994-2011)
NOTE: Both indexes are scaled so that the log level is 1 in January 1994.no liquidity services altogether. Long-term bond
yields are often used as benchmark rates, but
this approach is somewhat problematic…In
fact, if agents have a relatively short time hori-
zon in their portfolio allocation, what matters
as an opportunity cost is not the long-term yield
to maturity of the bond portfolio, but rather its
expected short-term rate of return. However,
this expected return cannot be observed
directly, and must be proxied in some way.
Barnett (2003, p. 50) argues against including
a bond yield in the calculation, preferring instead
to “add to the upper envelope [over the compo-
nent yield-curve-adjusted rates of return] a rate
structure premium representing the premium for
giving up the liquidity of the assets within the
envelope.”20
Stracca (2004) constructed a euro-zone Divisia
M3 monetary aggregate along these lines. He used
a short-term market interest rate to represent the
own rate for the marketable securities in M3 and
that rate exceeded the own rates of the other
components of M3.21 As he explains (p. 317),
“We assume that the marketable instruments
included in [euro] M3 provide some limited 
liquidity ser  vice and that they are risk free. Under
these assumptions, the rate of return on a risk-free
short-term financial asset providing no transaction
services should be given by a short-term market
interest rate plus a ‘liquidity services premium.’”
In practice, he set the liquidity premium equal
to 60 basis points, which was the average spread
between the short-term market rate and a 10-year
government bond rate. He found that (i) “similar
values of the premium lead to very similar patterns
of the Divisia monetary aggregate” and (ii) the
“annual growth rate of the Divisia index computed
in this manner is very close to—indeed almost
indistinguishable from—that of a Divisia index
computed taking the 10-year market interest rate
as the benchmark rate.”
We find Stracca’s (2004) reasoning com-
pelling—namely, that the benchmark rate should
exceed short-term money market interest rates.
The benchmark rate also must generate positive
user costs for components of MSI-ALL in order
to calculate that index. As such, we begin by
taking the maximum in each period over a set of
rates that includes all own rates of the compo-
nents of our broadest index (MSI-ALL), as well as
the short-term yields on selected money market
instruments, such as Treasury bills, commercial
paper, eurodollar deposits, and negotiable certifi-
cates of deposit.22 We include yields on instru-
ments with maturities of up to six months to be
consistent with our measurement of the own rate
on small-denomination time deposits (discussed
below). Following the literature, we refer to this
maximum rate as the upper envelope. The upper
envelope usually, though not always, equals one
of the short-term money market yields. Following
our previous discussion, we construct a bench-
mark rate by adding a liquidity services premium
to this upper envelope. Doing so, however, requires
that we determine a reasonable value for the
liquidity premium. We construct MSI using a
benchmark rate equal to the upper envelope plus
a constant (that is, not time-varying) liquidity
premium of 100 basis points, which we refer to
as our “preferred” benchmark rate.
As discussed previously, Stracca (2004)
selected a somewhat lower liquidity premium
than we do (60 basis points). Another point of
comparison is Jones et al. (2008), who defined
the benchmark rate as the 6-month Treasury bill
rate plus 200 basis points. Here, a benchmark
rate so constructed exceeds our upper envelope
throughout November 1982 to August 2008 by
an average of 144 basis points, suggesting a higher
liquidity premium of 144 basis points might be
reasonable.23 On the other hand, adding just 152
basis points (rather than 200 basis points) to the
6-month Treasury bill rate is sufficient to produce
a benchmark rate that exceeds the upper enve-
lope in all but two months over this period. In
Anderson and Jones
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2011 335
20 For another perspective on the benchmark rate, see Drake and
Mills (2005, pp. 153-54).
21 See Figure 1 (p. 315) of his paper.
22 Previously, these rates had been used to construct the MSI-L
aggregate in Anderson, Jones, and Nesmith (1997c).
23 The 6-month Treasury bill rate itself is always below the upper
envelope during this period. A considerably larger premium
would need to be added to the 6-month Treasury bill rate for the
resulting benchmark rate to exceed the upper envelope during the
height of the financial crisis. This is also the case in some earlier
periods, including 1980-81.our judgment, adding 100 basis points to the
upper envelope produces a plausible benchmark
rate. Yet because this liquidity premium, essen-
tially, is judgmental, it is important to assess the
sensitivity of the resulting MSI to this choice. To
measure the sensitivity of the MSI to the liquid-
ity premium, we calculated month-to-month and
year-over-year growth rates of pairs of MSI incor-
porating liquidity premiums of 60 and 144 basis
points (rather than 100, which is used for our
preferred benchmark rate) for each of the five
levels of aggregation. The correlations of the
growth rates for all pairs, at all five levels of
aggregation, exceeded 0.98, confirming Stracca’s
conclusion that the behavior of monetary index
numbers, including our MSI, is not highly
depen  dent on the precise size of the liquidity
premium.
We also calculate MSI using an “alternative”
benchmark rate that incorporates the Baa bond
yield. The alternative benchmark rate is calcu-
lated by setting the benchmark rate equal to the
larger of (i) the Baa bond yield and (ii) our pre-
ferred benchmark rate, such that the alternative
benchmark rate equals the Baa bond yield only
in months when the bond yield exceeds the upper
envelope by more than 100 basis points. Note that
this calculation differs from the practice in many
earlier Divisia analyses in which the Baa bond
yield was included in the set of rates used to select
the upper envelope and no liquidity premium
was added to the upper envelope. Our rationale
is that if the sum of the upper envelope plus a
100-basis-point liquidity premium (our preferred
benchmark) is a sensible measure of the bench-
mark rate, then the Baa bond yield should be used
as the benchmark rate only when it exceeds the
upper envelope by more than 100 basis points.
In the earlier years of our data (1967-81), our pre-
ferred benchmark exceeds the Baa bond yield
Anderson and Jones
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Effect of Benchmark Rate on Year-over-Year Percentage Growth of MSI-ALL (1983-2011)approximately 58 percent of the time—that is,
the preferred and alternative benchmark rates
are the same more often than not. In contrast,
during the later period (1982-2011), the Baa bond
yield exceeds our preferred benchmark rate
approximately 95 percent of the time; the excep-
tions are in 1989 and 2006-07.
Over the 1983-2011 period, the correlation
between the growth rates of indexes calculated
using the two benchmark rates (month-to-month or
year-over-year) exceeds 0.93 for all five aggregation
levels. Figure 3 compares year-over-year growth
rates for MSI-ALL using the two benchmark rates.
The comparable figure for MSI-M2 (not shown)
is similar to the one for MSI-ALL. For MSI-M2M
and MSI-MZM, year-over-year growth rates using
the two benchmark rates differ significantly in
1983 but much less so subsequently. 
Own Rates of Return
The MSI require estimates of the user costs
of each component, which are derived from the
spread between the benchmark rate of return and
the component’s own rate of return. Measurement
issues with respect to the benchmark rate were
discussed above. Here, we discuss issues related
to own rates of return on deposits at financial
institutions. With respect to measurement error,
Goldfeld and Sichel (1990, p. 316) write: “A first
issue concerns the own rate where there are
obvious measurement difficulties created via the
payment of implicit interest by the provision of
services and the existence of explicit service
charges. The lack of data makes it hard to evalu-
ate the seriousness of these difficulties.” There  -
fore, our assumptions are listed below:
Currency and travelers checks. We assume
a zero own rate. 
Demand deposits. We assume a zero own rate,
although some demand deposits earn an implicit
rate of return. As discussed by Donald Kohn (in
testimony to the Committee on Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate, June 22, 2004):
The prohibition of interest on demand deposits
distorts the pricing of transaction deposits and
associated bank services. In order to compete
for the liquid assets of businesses, banks have
been compelled to set up complicated proce-
dures to pay implicit interest on compensating
balance accounts. Banks also spend resources—
and charge fees—for sweeping the excess
demand deposits of businesses into money
market investments on a nightly basis.
The prohibition of interest on demand
deposits also distorts the pricing of other bank
products. Many demand deposits are not com-
pensating balances, and because banks cannot
pay explicit interest, they often try to attract
these deposits by pricing other bank services
below their actual cost.
Interest on demand deposits would clearly
benefit small businesses, which currently earn
no interest on their checking accounts. But
larger firms would also benefit as direct inter-
est payments replaced more costly sweep and
compensating balance arrangements. 
Barnett and Spindt (1982), Farr and Johnson
(1985), and Thornton and Yue (1992) separated
household and business demand deposits when
constructing Divisia monetary aggregates. House  -
hold deposits were assigned an own rate of zero,
but business demand deposits were assumed to
earn an implicit rate of return equal to a short-
term commercial paper rate net of the statutory
required reserve ratio consistent with firms hold-
ing balances to compensate their banks for ser  -
vices used (see Mahoney, 1988, pp. 198-99 for
further discussion). The data used in these stud-
ies to separate demand deposits into household
and business components are not available after
June 1990 (see Thornton and Yue, 1992, p. 46).
Consequently, Anderson, Jones, and Nesmith
(1997c) adopted an alternative procedure, assum-
ing that the implicit rate of return on demand
deposits was a fraction of the fully competitive
return and applying that own rate to total demand
deposits.
In the revised MSI reported in this article, we
set the own rate of return on demand deposits to
zero (rather than impute a rate of return) due to the
lack of data concerning the relative ownership of
demand deposits by households and businesses.24
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24 In addition, commercial sweeping of [business] demand deposits
into Treasury bills, institutional MMMFs, eurodollar accounts, and
similar liquid money market instruments increased significantly
during the 1990s (see Jones, Dutkowsky, and Elger, 2005). (Recall
that retail deposit sweeping consists of reclassifying checkable
Continued on next pageTo assess the implications of the zero own rate,
we created pairs of MSI for April 1971–June
1990 at all five levels of aggregation, in which
we assigned a zero own rate to demand deposits
in one MSI and, in the other assigned business
demand deposits an own rate equal to the one-
month commercial paper rate (adjusted for the
statutory reserve requirement tax on banks) and
household demand deposits an own rate of zero,
following closely Farr and Johnson (1985).25 (All
pairs used our preferred benchmark rate.) The
correlation of the growth rates (month-to-month
and year-over-year) of the pairs exceeds 0.98
except at the M1 level of aggregation, where the
correlation was 0.93 for month-to-month growth
rates and 0.91 for year-over-year growth rates. Fig  -
ures 4 and 5 show year-over-year growth rates for
the pairs of MSI-M1 and MSI-ALL, respectively. 
Money market mutual funds. The own rates
of return for MMMFs are unpublished data
obtained from the Federal Reserve Board. A sin-
gle rate is available beginning in June 1974, while
separate rates for retail and institutional MMMFs
are available beginning in January 1987. We use
the separate rates when they are available and,
as mentioned above, splice the MSI in January
25 The data used to construct the household and business demand
deposit series are available back to June 1970 but the data for the
one-month commercial paper rate are available only starting in
April 1971.
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deposits as MMDA deposits for the purpose of calculating statuto-
rily required reserves; these deposits do not leave the bank.) To the
extent that demand deposits are swept into institutional MMMFs,
they will be included in the MSI that contain those MMMFs—
specifically, MSI-MZM and MSI-ALL. To the extent that the deposits
are swept into money market instruments omitted from the MSI
and that the owners of these swept funds continue to regard them
as money, the MSI will understate the flow of monetary services
received and consumed by the owners of these deposits. Of course,
summation aggregates such as those reported on the Federal Reserve
Board’s H.6 statistical release will be understated for the same
reason (see Cynamon, Dutkowsky, and Jones, 2006).
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Effect of Implicit Returns on Year-over-Year Percentage Growth of MSI-M1 (April 1972–June 1990)1987.26 Specifically, in the first two segments
covering the periods up to January 1987, we
apply the single rate to both retail and institu-
tional MMMFs, whereas in the latter two seg-
ments covering the periods from January 1987
onward, we use separate rates.
Other bank and thrift deposits. Table 2 details
the data used to measure own rates of return for
the deposit components of the MSI up to August
1991. Available data include monthly figures for
deposit own rates published between 1983 and
1997 by the Federal Reserve Board in a supple-
mentary table (Monthly Survey of Selected
Deposits [FR2042]) to the H.6 statistical release.27
In addition, data beginning January 1987 have
been purchased by the Federal Reserve from the
Bank Rate Monitor Corporation. In our calcula-
tions, we choose to use the Federal Reserve’s
figures (rather than the Bank Rate Monitor data)
through August 1991 because this allows us to
treat MMDAs as a separate component for the
longest possible time period. Although the
Federal Reserve Board’s figures are available
through 1996, for continuity we choose to use
the Bank Rate Monitor data in the final segment
of the indexes (i.e., beginning in August 1991).
A series of calculations confirmed that the choice
has very little effect on the indexes. For small-
Anderson and Jones
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27 These data are available from the Federal Reserve Board beginning
in October 1983 but the published tables contain data going back
to April 1983 for Super NOWs and to May 1983 for MMDAs. We
used those additional observations to construct own rates after
rescaling them to coincide with the data obtained from the Federal
Reserve Board in October 1983. The first available observations
for Super NOWs and MMDAs are applied for the first few months
those assets are included in the MSI.
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Effect of Implicit Returns on Year-over-Year Percentage Growth of MSI-ALL (April 1972–June 1990)
26 Quantity figures for retail MMMFs begin in February 1973, so we
must construct a proxy for the rate between February 1973 and
May 1974. We do this via a regression against the overnight federal
funds rate as in Anderson, Jones, and Nesmith (1997c, p. 66). Anderson and Jones
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Table 2
OWN Rates for Deposit Components before August 1991
Monetary asset Sample period Own rate
Currency, travelers checks, and demand  Jan. 1967–present Zero
deposits
OCDs at commercial banks Jan. 1986–Aug. 1991 Average rate paid, NOW accounts,
commercial banks*
OCDs at thrift institutions Jan. 1986–Aug. 1991 Average rate paid, NOW accounts, 
savings banks*
OCDs at commercial banks excluding Super  Jan. 1974–Dec. 1980 Minimum (5.0%†, average of most 
NOW accounts common rate, savings deposits‡)
Jan. 1981–Jan. 1982 Minimum (5.25%†, average of most 
common rate, savings deposits‡)
Feb. 1982–Dec. 1985 5.25%†
OCDs at thrift institutions excluding Super  Jan. 1967–Dec. 1973 Zero
NOW accounts Jan. 1974–Dec. 1985 Same as commercial bank rate
Super NOW accounts at commercial banks Oct. 1983–Dec. 1985 Average rate paid, Super NOW 
accounts, commercial banks*
Super NOW accounts at thrift institutions Oct. 1983–Dec. 1985 Average rate paid, Super NOW 
accounts, savings banks*
Savings deposits at commercial banks  Jan. 1967–Jan. 1982 Average of most common rate, 
excluding MMDAs savings deposits‡
Feb. 1982–Dec. 1983 5.25%†
Jan. 1984–March 1986 5.5%†
April 1986–Aug. 1991 Average rate paid, savings accounts, 
commercial banks*
Savings deposits at thrift institutions  Jan. 1967–Dec. 1969 Commercial bank rate plus 75 basis 
excluding MMDAs points§
Jan. 1970–June 1973 Commercial bank rate plus 50 basis 
points¶
July 1973–Jan. 1982 Commercial bank rate plus 25 basis 
points¶
Feb. 1982–March 1986 5.5%†
April 1986–Aug. 1991 Average rate paid, savings accounts, 
savings banks*
MMDAs at commercial banks Oct. 1983–Aug. 1991 Average rates paid, money market 
deposit accounts, commercial banks*
MMDAs at thrift institutions Oct. 1983–Aug. 1991 Average rates paid, money market 
deposit accounts, savings banks*Anderson and Jones
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Table 2, cont’d
OWN Rates for Deposit Components before August 1991
Monetary asset Sample period Own rate
Small-denomination time deposits at  Jan. 1967–March 1970 Average of most common rate, 
commercial banks consumer-type time deposits‡
April 1970–June 1976 Average of most common rate, 
time deposits in denominations of 
less than $100,000, maturing in less 
than 1 year‡
July 1976–May 1978 Average of most common rate, time 
deposits in denominations of less 
than $100,000, other than domestic 
governmental units, maturing in 90 up
to 180 days‡
June 1978–Sep. 1983 Variable ceiling rate, money market 
time deposits, 6 months, commercial 
banks#
Oct. 1983–Aug. 1991 Average rate paid, interest-bearing 
deposits with balances of less than 
$100,000 with original maturities of 
92 to 182 days, commercial banks*
Small-denomination time deposits at thrift  Jan. 1967–May 1978 Commercial bank rate plus 25 basis
institutions points**,††
June 1978–Sep. 1983 Variable ceiling rate, money market 
time deposits, 6 months, thrifts#
Oct. 1983–Aug. 1991 Average rate paid, interest-bearing 
deposits with balances of less than 
$100,000 with original maturities of 
92 to 182 days, savings banks*
NOTE: *The data are obtained from the Federal Reserve. †See Table 8, Annual Statistical Digest (http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/publications/
astatdig/), various issues. ‡Quarterly estimates are obtained from the Federal Reserve Bulletin (http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/publications/
FRB/), various issues. Interpolated to obtain monthly values as described in text. §The Board of Governors established a maximum rate
of 4 percent on savings deposits over this period; see Table 12.4A, Banking and Monetary Statistics 1941-1970 (http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/
publications/bms2/). Over the same period, Table S.4.12, Federal Home Loan Bank Board Journal (January 1974, p. 51) reports that the
maximum rate payable on regular savings accounts was 4.75 percent for savings and loan associations. We therefore set the own rate
on savings deposits at thrift institutions as the commercial bank rate plus 75 basis points. ¶The added basis points equal the spread
between the maximum rates payable on savings deposits at savings and loan associations and mutual savings banks versus those at
commercial banks from Table 8, Annual Statistical Digest, various issues. #Variable ceiling rates were obtained from the Federal Reserve
Bulletin, various issues. **From January 1967 to December 1969, the Board of Governors established a maximum rate of 5 percent on
single-maturity time deposits of less than $100,000, 30 days to 1 year; see Table 12.4, Banking and Monetary Statistics 1941-1970. Over
the same period, Table S.4.12, Federal Home Loan Bank Board Journal (January 1974, p. 51) reports that the maximum rate payable on
accounts with maturities of 6 months to 1 year was 5.25 percent for savings and loan associations. We therefore set the own rate on
small-denomination time deposits at thrift institutions as the commercial bank rate plus 25 basis points. ††From January 1970 to June
1973, the added basis points equal the spread between the maximum rates payable on single-maturity time deposits of less than
$100,000, 30 days to 1 year, at savings and loan associations and mutual savings banks versus those at commercial banks; from Table 8,
Annual Statistical Digest, various issues. From July 1973 to May 1978, the added basis points equal the spread between the maximum
rates payable on time accounts, 90 days to 1 year, at savings and loan associations and mutual savings banks versus those at commercial
banks; from Table 8, Annual Statistical Digest, various issues.denomination time deposits, the own rate is
based on a 6-month maturity.
A key issue in constructing the MSI is that
deposits were subject to interest rate ceilings
under Regulation Q; our discussion here draws
on Gilbert (1986). Generally speaking, Anderson,
Jones, and Nesmith (1997c) assumed that the
interest rate ceilings were binding and used them
to form own rates for the components of the MSI
going back to 1960. According to Gilbert (1986,
p. 26), however, this was typically not the case
before 1966:
From the mid-1930s to the mid-1960s, the ceil-
ing rates on time and savings deposits gener-
ally were above market interest rates and above
the average interest rates paid on time and sav-
ings deposits by member banks. In 1957 and
1962, when market interest rates rose near or
above the ceiling rates on savings deposits,
these ceilings were raised…Thus, for the first
30 or so years of their existence, ceiling interest
rates on time and savings deposits were above
interest rates on Treasury securities in all but
a few months, and average interest rates paid
by member banks on all time and savings
deposits were below the lowest ceiling rate in
effect, the rate on savings deposits.
Moreover, as noted by Gilbert, thrift institutions
were subject to interest rate ceilings only begin-
ning in 1966 (see Ruebling, 1970).
Quarterly figures for interest rates paid by
commercial banks on various types of time and
savings deposits are available from January 1967
to January 1982; these figures were based on sur-
veys by the Federal Reserve Board and the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) (see Lefever,
1979). In the revised MSI presented in this article,
monthly own rates for commercial bank deposits
are estimated from these published quarterly fig-
ures. The start date for the MSI has been changed
to January 1967 (previously, it was January 1960),
reflecting the availability of the quarterly data and
the fact that thrift rates were not subject to ceil-
ings until 1966. Through January 1982, monthly
own rates on savings deposits at commercial
banks (excluding MMDAs) are obtained by inter-
polation from the published quarterly figures.28
Due to a lack of data, the own rate on savings
deposits at thrift institutions is set equal to the
own rate at commercial banks plus the difference
between the corresponding ceiling rates. From
February 1982 until March 1986, the own rates
are set at the corresponding ceilings. The Federal
Reserve’s monthly figures are available beginning
in April 1986.
For small-denomination time deposits at
commercial banks, the availability of quarterly
figures changes through time. For January 1967—
March 1970, we use the published rate for 
“consumer-type” time deposits. For April 1970–
June 1976, we use the rate on deposits maturing
in less than a year.29 For July 1976–May 1978,
we use the rate on deposits maturing in 90 to
180 days. Similar to savings deposits, monthly
estimates of own rates on small-denomination
time deposits at commercial banks are interpo-
lated from the quarterly figures. For January
1967–May 1978, we set the own rate for small-
denomination time deposits at thrift institutions
equal to the own rate on deposits at commercial
banks plus the difference between the corre  -
sponding interest rate ceilings.
Beginning in June 1978, commercial banks
and thrift institutions were permitted to offer 6-
month money market time deposits with ceiling
rates tied to average auction yields on 6-month
Treasury bills. Survey evidence suggests that rates
paid were close to the ceilings. Consequently,
we set the own rate on small-denomination time
deposits at commercial banks and at thrift insti-
tutions for June 1978–September 1983 equal to
the ceiling rates on 6-month money market time
deposits. The Federal Reserve Board’s monthly
figures are available beginning in October 1983.
Due to lack of data, the own rate on OCDs at
commercial banks (excluding Super NOWs) is
assumed to be the smaller of the own rate on sav-
ings deposits at commercial banks and the ceiling
Anderson and Jones
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28 We interpolate using cubic splines over periods when the ceiling
rate is unchanged. When the ceiling rate changes, the last available
estimate is used until the new ceiling is in effect. If the quarterly
estimate is unchanged between two or more survey dates, we use
that value for the intervening months.
29 Note that the January 1970 figure for consumer-type time deposits
reflects an increase in certain ceiling rates, but ceilings did not
increase for deposits with maturities of less than one year. Thus,
we actually use the October 1969 value until March 1970. The
April 1976 estimate for deposits with maturities of less than one
year is used for May and June 1976. rate on NOW accounts at commercial banks from
January 1974 until January 1982. For February
1982–December 1985, the ceiling rate on NOW
accounts is used. The own rate for OCDs at thrift
institutions is set to zero before January 1974.
For January 1974–December 1985, it is equal to
the own rate on OCDs at commercial banks.
Yield-Curve Adjustment of 
Small-Denomination Time Deposits 
The stock of small-denomination time
deposits includes deposits with a range of differ-
ent maturities. Farr and Johnson (1985) referred
to such components as “composite asset stocks.”
They constructed own rates for composite asset
stocks by yield-curve adjusting the available inter-
est rate data. The yield-curve adjustment con-
sisted of taking an interest rate for a particular
maturity and subtracting the corresponding term
premium obtained from the Treasury yield curve.
The stated purpose of the adjustment was as fol-
lows: “Given typical yield-curve relationships,
liquidity premiums keep rates on long-maturity
assets higher than those on short-maturity assets.
Thus, before the rates can be compared, they must
Anderson and Jones
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Table 3
Correlations: Growth Rates of MSI and Sum Aggregates*
M1 M2M M2 MZM ALL
Correlations between MSI
M2M 0.75
M2  0.75 0.90
MZM 0.69 0.95 0.89
ALL 0.66 0.82 0.94 0.91
M3 0.69 0.82 0.95 0.85 0.97
Correlations between sum aggregates
M1 M2M M2 MZM ALL
M2M 0.53
M2  0.49 0.68
MZM 0.46 0.95 0.67
ALL 0.36 0.58 0.88 0.72
M3 0.25 0.32 0.75 0.38 0.79
Correlations between MSI and sum aggregates
MSI
Sums M1 M2M M2 MZM ALL M3
M1 (adjusted) 0.98 0.75 0.73 0.69 0.64 0.66
M2M 0.44 0.79 0.61 0.76 0.56 0.49
M2  0.44 0.62 0.78 0.63 0.75 0.71
MZM 0.38 0.74 0.59 0.80 0.64 0.53
ALL 0.32 0.52 0.68 0.67 0.80 0.73
M3 0.22 0.31 0.51 0.36 0.56 0.69
NOTE: Sample period for calculations excluding M3, January 1967–May 2011; for calculations including M3, January 1967–February 2006.
*Change from previous month, percent annual rate.Anderson and Jones
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Comparison of Year-over-Year Percentage Growth in MSI-ALL and MSI-M3 (1968-2006)
NOTE: Both measures are based on the authors’ preferred benchmark rate.
The Discontinuance of M3 
The Federal Reserve Board discontinued publication of the M3 monetary aggregate in early 2006 because “M3
does not appear to convey any additional information about economic activity that is not already embodied in M2
and has not played a role in the monetary policy process for many years” (H.6 statistical release for March 23, 2006).
Data on the non-M2 components of M3 were discontinued at the same time except for institutional MMMFs.
Subsequently, some analysts suggested that the Board’s assertion regarding the lack of additional information in
M3 was in error. To assess the importance of the end of M3, we constructed an MSI-M3 through February 2006 (the
most recent feasible date) and compared it with the other five MSI using our preferred benchmark rate. The top
panel of Table 3 shows correlations between month-to-month growth rates of the five MSI and MSI-M3. As the
table shows, MSI-M3 is most highly correlated with MSI-M2 and MSI-ALL (0.95 and 0.97, respectively). This is also
the case for year-over-year growth rates (Figure 6 shows year-over-year growth rates of MSI-ALL and MSI-M3). This
lends support to the view that little may have been lost, at least as far as the MSI are concerned, by the discontin-
uance of M3. On the other hand, it is interesting to note that year-over-year growth of MSI-M2 and MSI-ALL
diverged much more than usual in 2010 due to sharp declines in institutional MMMFs (see the discussion in the
main text). Figure 7 compares year-over-year growth for MSI-M2 and MSI-ALL for 1988-2011.30 Thus, it seems rea-
sonable to infer that an MSI-M3, if it could be constructed for the same period, would display a similar divergence,
suggesting that some information value, at least during periods of financial market upheaval, was lost with the dis-
continuance of M3.
30 The indexes are identical until institutional MMMFs enter in 1974.be put on some common basis—the liquidity
premiums must be extracted” (Farr and Johnson,
1985, p. 6). They then constructed user costs by
using the maximum of the yield-curve-adjusted
interest rates as the own rate. Anderson, Jones,
and Nesmith (1997c) used a different procedure
to calculate user costs of composite asset stocks
but their procedure continued to involve the use
of yield-curve-adjusted interest rates (see p. 76
of their paper for details). 
As of this revision, we have simplified the
calculation of the own rates of return on small-
denomination time deposits. As discussed above,
we now use the rates of return on 6-month deposits
going back to the mid-1970s as the own rates. We
do not yield-curve adjust any rates of return,
including the short-term yields on the money
market instruments included in the upper enve-
lope. To assess the significance of this change,
we constructed alternative indexes over the
period from August 1991 onward that incorpo-
rated yield-curve adjustment. Specifically, we
constructed alternative own rates of return on
small-denomination time deposits defined as
the maximum of the yield-curve-adjusted rates
on the available maturities and we yield-curve
adjusted all short-term yields included in the
upper envelope. These indexes differed very little
from our indexes without yield-curve adjustment. 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
This section presents an empirical analysis
of our newly revised MSI. Figures 8 and 9 illus-
trate the short- and long-run growth of the MSI.
Figures 10 and 11 show the interaction between
the scope of the indexes and the aggregation
Anderson and Jones
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Comparison of Year-over-Year Percentage Growth in MSI-M2 and MSI-ALL (1988-2011)
NOTE: Both measures are based on the authors’ preferred benchmark rate.method. We analyze the components of the MSI
during the recent financial crisis (2007-09) in
Figures 12, 13, and 14. Throughout this section,
all figures are based on MSI computed with our
preferred benchmark rate. 
Long-Run and Short-Run Growth 
Figure 8 shows both month-to-month and
year-over-year MSI growth. Generally speaking,
movements in the five MSI are similar. During the
most recent five years, growth accelerated during
2007 and 2008 in response to Federal Reserve
policies, slowed during 2009 (with negative year-
over-year growth for MSI-MZM and MSI-ALL
due to runoffs in institutional-type MMMFs),
and strengthened during 2010 in response to
expansionary Federal Reserve policies. The MSI
cluster into three groups: MSI-M1, MSI-M2 and
MSI-ALL, and MSI-MZM and MSI-M2M.
Figure 9 depicts growth of MSI during four
selected decade-long periods. Panel A displays
the late 1960s to mid-1970s, a period of increas-
ing inflation. MSI growth slowed during 1969 as
Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) policy
tightened, with decreases during 1970 in the lev-
els of MSI-M2M and MSI-MZM. Steady growth
resumed late in 1970 as the FOMC eased policy.
Panel B includes the 1979-82 period of disinfla-
tion and the subsequent recovery. Growth of
MSI-M1 slowed little during the period, while
growth of both MSI-M2M and MSI-MZM fell
rapidly beginning in mid-1978 and remained near
zero until the mid-1982 easing of Fed policy.
Panel C includes the 1990 recession and its sub-
sequent “jobless recovery” plus the productivity
acceleration that started in late 1992. The effects
of the Federal Reserve’s policy easing in 1991 and
policy tightening in 1994 are apparent. Panel D
includes the 2001 recession/recovery, the subse-
quent housing boom and financial crisis, and the
Federal Reserve’s credit-easing policies during
2008 and its 2009-11 quantitative easing policies.
During 2009, two of the indexes, MSI-MZM and
MSI-ALL, display absolute decreases due to
runoffs in institutional-type MMMFs. 
Method of Aggregation Versus Scope
of the Aggregate
This section compares and contrasts the MSI
with each other and monetary aggregates con-
structed by summation of the dollar amounts of
the included assets; the latter are denoted as
“SUM-M1” and so on. SUM-M2M, SUM-MZM,
and SUM-M2 are identical to the monetary aggre-
gates available through FRED.31 SUM-M1 is not
the same as the Federal Reserve’s M1 aggregate
because it is retail-sweep adjusted to be compa-
rable with MSI-M1.32 SUM-ALL is identical to
SUM-M2 plus institutional MMMFs, which are
also available through FRED.
Measurement of a monetary aggregate involves
two general concepts: the method of aggregation
(as an economic index number or via summation
of the included assets) and the scope of the
aggregate (i.e., which assets are included in the
aggregate). With respect to the former, monetary
aggregates produced by the Federal Reserve’s
Board of Governors are summation aggregates:
Each is the simple unweighted sum of the dollar
values of a selected set of financial assets. The
MSI, in contrast, are chain-weighted superlative
statistical index numbers. With respect to the
scope, both the MSI and summation aggregates
are (almost) nested: M1 is a proper subset of
M2M and M2M is a proper subset of M2. The
aggregation-level MZM differs from the level M2M
by the inclusion in the former of institutional-
type MMMFs. All the narrower indexes are proper
subsets of the aggregate “ALL.” From the stand-
point of monetary aggregation/index number
theory, the two issues are related since superlative
index numbers should be constructed over groups
of monetary assets that are weakly separable. For
further discussion of this view, see Barnett (1982),
Swofford and Whitney (1991), and Belongia (1996).
Figure 10 shows a scatterplot matrix of month-
to-month percentage growth rates of the five MSI;
correlations between the MSI are shown in the
Anderson and Jones
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31 FRED (Federal Reserve Economic Data); available through the 
St. Louis Fed’s website (http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/).
32 SUM-M1, as measured here, equals the Federal Reserve’s M1
aggregate plus the estimated amount of retail sweeps; Dutkowsky,
Cynamon, and Jones (2006) and Cynamon, Dutkowsky, and Jones
(2006) refer to this as M1RS (M1 plus retail sweeps).Anderson and Jones
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NOTE: The left panels show month-to-month percentage change, at an annual rate, in each MSI aggregate; changes in excess of ±30
percent are excluded. Excluded dates and values are M1, 1986:12 (32.4 percent), 2001:09 (44.8 percent), 2008:09 (32.9 percent), 2008:12
(50.9 percent); M2M, 2001:09 (37.2 percent), 2008:12 (32.5 percent); M2, 2001:09 (32.7 percent), 2008:12 (31.1 percent); MZM, 2001:09
(38.9 percent), 2008:12 (32.8 percent); ALL, 2001:09 (34.7 percent), 2008:12 (31.7 percent). Right panels show year-to-year percentage
change, monthly (no truncated points are omitted). Absolute decreases in MSI-MZM and MSI-ALL during 2010 were due to sharp
decreases in institutional-type MMMFs. Intervals between National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) business cycle peaks and
troughs are shaded.Anderson and Jones
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A. Jan 1967–Dec 1976
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Growth of the MSI Aggregates (selected decades)
NOTE: Each panel compares the path of (the log of) the specified MSI aggregate during a selected decade-long period. Intervals between
NBER business cycle peaks and troughs are shaded. For A, log levels, January 1967 = 10. For B, log levels, January 1978 = 1.0. For C,
log levels, January 1989 = 1.0. For D, log levels, March 2001 = 1.0.top panel of Table 3. We note that M3 is included
in Table 3 but not in the associated figures. Among
the MSI, the lowest correlations involve MSI-M1
(first column). Aside from MSI-M1, all of the MSI
are mutually highly correlated. The correlation
between MSI-M2M and MSI-MZM is 0.95 and
that between MSI-M2 and MSI-ALL is 0.94. The
middle panel of Table 3 shows the correlations
between the sum aggregates, which (except for
M2M and MZM) are lower than the correlations
among the MSI. Figure 11 shows a scatterplot
matrix comparing the month-to-month growth
rates of the MSI and the corresponding summa-
tion aggregates; corresponding correlations are
shown in the bottom panel of Table 3.When com-
paring SUM aggregates with the MSI, a general
finding is that the SUM aggregates are all most
highly correlated with the MSI constructed over
the same components.33 The correlation is high-
est (0.98) between SUM-M1 (adjusted for retail
deposit sweeps) and MSI-M1. For M2M, M2,
MZM, and ALL, the correlations between the
SUM aggregate and the comparable MSI are
between 0.78 and 0.80. For M3, it is 0.69. SUM-M1
(adjusted for retail sweeps) displays modest posi-
tive correlation with all of the other MSI as well
(0.64 to 0.75). Other SUM aggregates show mod-
est positive correlation with at least some MSI,
although correlations involving MSI-M1 are all
low. For example, correlations between SUM-M2
Anderson and Jones
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33 Except for M3, the MSI are also most highly correlated with the
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Figure 10
MSI Indexes (January 1967–April 2011)
NOTE: Each panel compares the monthly growth of the two specified MSI. The MSI aggregates are adjusted for the effects of retail
deposit sweep programs by removing such deposits from savings deposits and including them in checkable deposits. Monthly growth
rates in excess of 30 percent are excluded from the chart; see the footnote to Figure 8 for a list of the excluded points.and MSI other than MSI-M1 range from 0.62 to
0.75. It is interesting to note all of the MSI, except
MSI-M3, are less highly correlated with MSI-M1
than they are with the SUM aggregate constructed
over the same components (for MSI-M3, the cor-
relations are the same). Thus, the choice between
M1 and a broader level of aggregation clearly
matters more than the method of aggregation.
A Case Study of MSI Components
During the 2007-2009 Financial Crisis
Economic theory suggests that the MSI pro-
vide a superior measure of the flow of monetary
services that households and firms derive from
holding monetary assets. In this section, we briefly
survey the behavior of component quantities of
the MSI and their user costs during the financial
crisis; more complete modeling is a topic for future
research. The construction of the MSI provides
data beyond quantity indexes, including measures
of the user cost of monetary services (essentially,
the price of owning immediately available funds
plus the cost of positioning an asset portfolio so
that such funds are readily available when needed)
that are interesting to examine because the recent
financial crisis was largely a “liquidity” crisis in
Anderson and Jones







M1 M2M M2 MZM ALL
































































































































MSI Indexes Versus Sum Money Aggregates (January 1967–April 2011)
NOTE: Each panel compares the monthly growth of the specified MSI and the corresponding simple-sum monetary aggregate. The sum
aggregate M1 (adj) and all MSI are adjusted for the effects of retail deposit sweep programs as described in the text. Excluded points
for the MSI are listed in the notes of Figure 8. Excluded points for the Sum aggregates are for M1 adjusted for retail sweeps, 1986:12
(32.7), 2001:09 (43.2), 2008:09 (32.5), 2008:12 (50.1); for M2M, 1982:12 (44.4), 1983:01 (123.8), 1983:02 (79.1), 1983:03 (35.2), 2001:09 (32.7),
2008:12 (30.8); for M2, 1983:01 (33.40); for MZM, 1980:07 (31.4), 1981:04 (30.1), 1982:12 (41.0), 1983:01 (116.9), 1983:02 (75.7), 1983:03
(32.5), 2001:09 (37.3), 2008:02 (31.4), 2008:12 (31.6); for ALL, 1983:01 (31.7), 2001:09 (30.2), 2008:12 (30.1). Values in parentheses indicate
percent.which the functioning of short-term money and
financial markets was impaired.
Figure 12 shows changes in the component
quantities of the MSI. For checkable deposits
(demand deposits and OCDs), savings, and small-
denomination time deposits, we have summed the
amounts at commercial banks and thrift institu-
tions, calculating the user costs by dividing the cor-
responding summed expenditures by the sum of
the quantities. There is a clear break in all series
circa September 2008 (when Lehman Brothers filed
for bankruptcy, the federal government rescued
AIG, and the shadow banking system largely shut
down).34 With respect to individual components
during late 2008, the sharp increase in checkable
deposits reflects, in part, extension by the FDIC
in October 2008 of deposit insurance without
limit to non-interest-bearing checkable deposits.
Increases in savings and small-denomination time
deposits likely reflect flight to quality since these
deposits are FDIC insured. Small dimples in
MMMF shares likely reflect shaken investor con-
fidence before the federal government’s October
2008 de facto extension of deposit insurance to
shares in these funds. During 2009 and 2010,
steep runoffs in the components except currency,
checkable deposits, and savings deposits are
Anderson and Jones
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34 Anderson and Gascon (2009) examine the 2008 sudden stop in
the asset-backed commercial paper market, the heart of the U.S.
“shadow” banking system.
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Major Components of MSI
NOTE: Each panel shows the nominal quantity (in billions of current dollars) of a group of monetary assets included in the MSI.
Checkable deposits includes, and savings deposits excludes, the amount of deposits in retail deposit sweep programs. apparent; the trough in economic activity occurred
during the second quarter of 2009 and the stock
market low point was in March 2009. 
Whereas economic theory suggests that all
components of an MSI furnish monetary services
(either as medium of exchange or as an asset read-
ily convertible to medium of exchange), the user
costs (prices) of monetary assets differ because
they earn different rates of return. Figure 13 shows
the real user costs. Three major shifts are apparent.
First, the user costs decreased sharply in late
2007–early 2008, in part due to FOMC policy
actions. Second, the user costs increased almost
steadily during 2008 before jumping sharply dur-
ing September when short-term financial markets
shut down. Third, user costs decreased sharply
and then steadily during 2009, again in response
to FOMC policy action. During the financial crisis,
the user cost of monetary services accurately
tracked the scarcity of liquidity due to impaired
short-term money markets. Indeed, increases in
the price of monetary services (i.e., the price of
liquidity) reinforce Federal Reserve Chairman
Ben Bernanke’s argument that immediate relief
of financial market stress (“credit easing”) was
essential.35
Anderson and Jones
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Figure 13
Real User Cost of Monetary Services by Component
NOTE: Each panel shows the real user cost of the monetary services obtained through the specified group of assets. Within each group,
the user costs are simple arithmetic averages of the user costs of the components within that group. 
35 Anderson and Gascon (2011) survey many such market assistance
programs and review evidence regarding their role in preventing
a slide into economic depression.Figure 14 combines information from Figures
12 and 13 to examine fluctuations in expenditures
on money services during the financial crisis.
Note that the behavior of component expenditure
shares depends on the price elasticity of demand—
a component’s share might increase, decrease, or
be unchanged when its price increases. In the left
column of the figure, the shares of expenditure
(on monetary services) corresponding to the three
most-liquid assets decreased throughout 2008.
In contrast, the expenditure shares for MMMFs
increased throughout 2008. The expenditure
share for small-denomination time deposits
increased slightly during 2008, followed by a
sharp decrease during 2009. Deeper understand-
ing of these expenditure share patterns is a topic
for future research.36
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The revised MSI and the underlying data used
to construct them as presented in this article are
Anderson and Jones
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Expenditure Shares of Monetary Services
NOTE: Each panel shows expenditures on a set of components from MSI-ALL as a share of total expenditure on MSI-ALL. Expenditures
incurred to obtain the monetary services furnished by each group of assets equal the sum (across the assets in the group) of the products
of each asset’s real user cost times the asset’s nominal quantity (or equivalently, the product of each asset’s nominal user cost times
the real quantity of each asset). 
36 A standard way to model the expenditure share system would be
to estimate a demand systems model for the monetary assets. Jones
et al. (2008), for example, estimate a Fourier flexible functional
form model for the components of MSI-M2.valuable resources to empirical economists inter-
ested in the role that money plays in the economy.
This revision to the MSI includes a number of
changes that should improve the quality of the
underlying data. We now adjust the savings and
checkable deposit components for the effects of
retail sweep programs and have improved the
measures of savings and small-denomination time
deposit rates in the Regulation Q era. We also
introduce a new benchmark rate, defined as the
largest rate in a set of rates that includes the own
rates of the components of the broadest index
and yields on selected short-term money market
rates (the upper envelope) plus a modest liquid-
ity premium. Pre  viously the benchmark rate was
defined by including the Baa bond yield in the
upper envelope and not adding a liquidity pre-
mium. We believe that this new benchmark rate
improves on the previous practice since recent
literature has criticized using long-term bond
yields to measure the benchmark rate (e.g.,
Stracca, 2004). Nevertheless, the benchmark rate
remains one of the most problematic aspects of
the Divisia approach in terms of being as much a
conceptual issue as an empirical one.
Several issues raised in this paper relate to
the components of M1. A major problem with
the official M1 monetary aggregate is, of course,
retail sweeping of transaction deposits. Although
not addressed in this paper, commercial sweeping
of demand deposits further complicates interpre-
tation of the M1 aggregate (see Jones, Dutkowsky,
and Elger, 2005, and Dutkowsky, Cynamon, and
Jones, 2006). Another problem concerns implicit
remuneration of demand deposits. Within M1,
only OCDs are explicitly remunerated. Before the
paper by Anderson, Jones, and Nesmith (1997c),
the builders of Divisia monetary aggregates pro-
ceeded as if demand deposits held by businesses
were remunerated at a rate equal to the short-term
commercial paper rate adjusted for statutory
reserve requirements; the data used to distinguish
between business and household demand deposits
were discontinued in 1990. Our decision to not
include implicit returns on demand deposits is
based on this lack of data. We are concerned, in
particular, about whether MSI-M1 provides much
useful information beyond what is provided by a
sweep-adjusted version of its simple sum counter-
part (e.g., Figure 11, row 1). Moreover, the main
advantage of the Divisia approach relates to the
construction of broader aggregates. As Lucas
(2000, pp. 270-71) has argued, “I share the widely
held opinion that M1 is too narrow an aggregate
for this period [the 1990s], and I think that the
Divisia approach offers much the best pros  pects
for resolving the difficulty.” 
Finally, a number of analysts have argued that
the Federal Reserve’s 2006 decision to discon-
tinue publication of its M3 monetary aggregate
significantly constrained subsequent monetary
analyses. We found that the growth rates of MSI-
M2 and MSI-ALL are both highly correlated with
growth rates of MSI-M3 when it can be computed
providing some reassurance with respect to the
discontinuance of M3. On the other hand, growth
rates of MSI-M2 and MSI-ALL diverged much
more than usual in 2010, suggesting that MSI-M3
might have contained some additional informa-
tion in recent years. 
Anderson and Jones
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More on Index Number Theory
In index number theory, a quantity index is a function of the quantities and prices of a set of goods
in two periods. Diewert (1976a) defined the concepts of exact and superlative indexes, which Barnett
(1980) applied to monetary data.37 In this context, the real stocks of a set of monetary assets act as quan-
tities paired with their corresponding user cost prices. With this in mind, let Q￿ˀ0,ˀ1,m0,m1￿ denote a
monetary quantity index, where ˀ0,m0 and ˀ1,m1 represent data for a set of monetary assets in two
periods. Following Diewert (1993, p. 198), the quantity index is exact for the utility function V￿m￿ if 
for every ˀ0,ˀ1,m0,m1 such that mi maximizes V￿m￿ subject to ˀi . m ≤ ˀi . mi for i = 0,1. Thus, if the
quantity index is greater (less) than 1, it indicates that the utility function is increasing (decreasing)
from m0 to m1. A quantity index is superlative if it is exact for a linearly homogeneous utility function,
which can provide a second-order approximation to an arbitrary linearly homogeneous utility function
(see Diewert, 1993, p. 204).
Diewert (1976a) also defined exact and superlative price indexes. A quantity index, Q, and a price
index, P, satisfy weak factor reversal (Diewert, 1993, p. 198) if
Following Diewert (1993, p. 206), a pair of indexes is superlative if either the quantity index is superla-
tive or the price index is superlative and they satisfy weak factor reversal. 
Chain-weighting can be used to facilitate comparisons over more than two periods. A chain-weighted
quantity index, Vt, is a time series constructed from a quantity index number formula as follows:
The MSI are chain-weighted monetary quantity indexes, which are based on the superlative Törnqvist-
Theil quantity index number formula. An alternative would be to use the Fisher ideal quantity index,
which is also superlative.38 Farr and Johnson (1985), for example, used the Fisher ideal index to con-
struct their series. In principle, other superlative indexes could also be considered. Diewert (1976a)
proved that the quadratic mean of order r quantity and price indexes is superlative for all r. The
Törnqvist-Theil and Fisher ideal indexes are special cases (r = 0 and r = 2, respectively). Using two data  -
sets, Hill (2006, p. 38) found that these superlative indexes can differ significantly from one another.
His interpretation is as follows: 
The problem is that, as the parameter r increases in absolute value, the superlative price (quantity) index
formula becomes increasingly sensitive to outliers in the price-relatives (quantity-relatives) distribution.
Admittedly, the only three superlative indexes that have been seriously advocated in the index number
literature all lie in the range 0 ≤ r ≤ 2, where the superlative formula is relatively unaffected by outliers.
Over this range, all the superlative indexes do approximate each other closely. Conceptually, however, the
economic approach provides no reason for restricting the range thus.
Thus, the choice of which index number formula to use seems to be more consequential than previously
thought. 
V V Q m m , ,m ,m 1 0 0 1 0 1 ( ) = ( ) ( ) π π
Q P π π π π
π
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37 The reader is referred to Diewert (1993) for a detailed survey of index number theory.
38 Both the Törnqvist-Theil and Fisher ideal quantity indexes have also been shown to have attractive properties even if the utility function is
not linearly homogeneous (see Diewert, 1976a,b, and Diewert, 1993, pp. 211-13). Diewert (1976a, pp. 137-38) offers several reasons why the
Fisher ideal index is preferable to other superlative indexes; among these is its consistency with revealed preference theory. 360 SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2011 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW